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Abstract
Experimental studies have shown that trust and reciprocity are effec-
tive in increasing efficiency when complete contracting is infeasible. One
example is the study by Berg et al. (1995) of the investment game. In this
game the person who receives the investment is the one who may reward
the investor. This is a direct reward game. Similar to Dufwenberg et al.
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(2000) it is investigated to what extent trust and reward are still observable
when reward is indirect; i.e., when the investor may only be rewarded by
a third person who did not receive his investment. Furthermore we inves-
tigate the influence of social comparison (information about other players’
investments). Our main finding is that mainly indirect reward reduces sig-
nificantly mutual cooperation.
1. Introduction
Cooperation often means to invest individually in group success without being sure
of one’s own share of the group reward. For instance, this may be the case in joint
ventures, e.g. R & D-joerg et al. observed that many participants in a laboratory
experiment did invest positive amounts, which can be interpreted as trust. In
many cases trust was honored by second movers via positive rewards, which may
be interpreted as reciprocity. Reciprocity is usually understood as “punishing
someone who has treated me badly” or as “rewarding someone who has treated
me well”. In case of the investment game reciprocal behavior implies a positive
correlation between investments and rewards. That behavior is to some degree
guided by trust and reciprocity was shown in several other studies as well (see
e.g. Fahr and Irlenbusch (1998), Fehr and Gächter (forthcoming), Güth, Klose,
Königstein and Schwalbach (1998)). For a theoretical discussion of motives like
fairness and reciprocity see e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Rabin (1993).
In this paper we present an experiment in which we investigate trust and reci-
procity in investment games with direct reward versus indirect reward. In the
direct reward investment game (like the game by Berg et al.) a person X1 sends
an investment to person Y1 and may be rewarded by person Y1. In the indirect
reward game personX1 sends an investment to Y1, but may not be rewarded by Y1
but by a third person Y2. Such a game was studied experimentally by Dufwenberg,
Gneezy, Güth, and van Damme (2000) who also discuss the relevance of indirect
reciprocity. Person Y2 observes X1’s investment. So, the third person, Y2, might
reciprocally reward X1’s trust. However, we expect that trust and reciprocity
are less powerful when reward is indirect rather than direct. This is our main
hypothesis. We furthermore investigate in games with direct reward whether the
second mover’s reward choice depends only on the investment he received himself
or whether it is also influenced by information about investments received by other
second movers. We refer to this information treatment as ‘social comparison’.
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We find clear support for our main hypothesis. Investment and reward are strongly
reduced when indirect reward is compared with direct reward. This systematic
effect cannot be explained by rationality theory nor by a model that combines
rationality and noisy play. It sheds some light on the effectiveness of the ‘trust—
reward’ mechanism. Namely, our results suggest that the considerations under-
lying this mechanism do not only regard the payoff distribution but also regard
procedure by which the distribution is achieved (see on the psychological concept
of procedural fairness, for instance Tyler, T., (1994), Rutte, C., and Messick, D.,
(1995)). With respect to social comparison we find that it increases investment
and reward. However, these effects are not statistically significant.
The next section explains the experimental games in detail: the investment game
with direct reward and full information, the investment game with direct reward
and partial information, and the investment game with indirect reward and full
information. Section 3 provides a theoretical discussion. Thereafter we describe
experimental procedures (section 4). In section 5 we provide the data analysis
and in section 6 we discuss our findings.
2. Experimental Games
2.1. Direct Reward Full Information (DFI)
The investment game withDirect reward andFull Information (DFI) is displayed
in figure 1. Two players X1 and X2 choose investments x1, respectively x2, which
are send to two other players Y1 and Y2. Investment xi has to satisfy :
xi ∈ {0, 1, ...10} , i = 1, 2. (2.1)
Player Y1 (Y2) receives 3x1 (3x2); thus, the invested amounts are tripled. Both
players Yi, i = 1, 2, are informed about both investments x1 and x2 (full infor-
mation). The disclosure rule is known by all players from the start. Then player
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Y1 (Y2) chooses reward y1 (y2), which is sent to player X1 (X2). Reward yi has to
satisfy :
yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 3xi + 10} , i = 1, 2. (2.2)
After the choices yi player Xi is informed about yi, and the game ends. The
payoffs are
Player Xi : 10− xi + yi
Player Yi : 10 + 3xi − yi
for i = 1, 2
X1
Y1
1y
receives 3 times x1
 x 2  y 2
X2
Y2
receives 3 times x2
 x 1
Figure 1 : Direct Reward Full Information (DFI)
Note that (2.2) implies that player Yi may send back even more than the tripled
investment. In the experiment this meant that we gave players Yi an initial
money amount of 10 units. It is the same amount each player Xi received. By
this we guaranteed that players Yi might earn something even if investment is
zero. Furthermore, it is advantageous in the indirect reward game (see below),
since it allows player Yi to reward player Xj even if the investment of player Xi
is zero.
In DFI exchange takes place within pairs (X1 with Y1 and X2 with Y2) but
not between pairs. Interaction between pairs is purely informational. Moreover,
the information is strategically irrelevant in view of economic rationality (see
below). Information flows are visualized by the dotted curves in Figure 1. In DFI
treatment, all players, X, X2, Y1 and Y2 are informed about both, x1 and x2.
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2.2. Direct Reward Partial Information (DPI)
The investment game with Direct reward and Partial Information (DPI) is dis-
played in figure 2. It is the investment game studied by Berg et al. It is equivalent
to DFI except for the information players Yi, i = 1, 2, receive about the chosen
investments. Namely, in DPI player Yi is informed only about xi, but not about
xj (i = 1, 2, i 6= j). Figure 2 presents two pairs playing DPI in order to stress
the similarity between the games we investigate. The dotted curves represent the
information flows (i.e. Yi is only informed about xi). In the experiment subjects
were told they were subdivided into groups of four and would be matched in pairs.
Even though in DPI the subdivision into groups of four is meaningless, we in-
troduced the experiment in this way in order to make experimental procedures
between treatments as similar as possible.
X1
Y1
1y
receives 3 times x1
 x 2  y 2
X2
Y2
receives 3 times x2
 x 1
Figure 2 : Direct Reward Partial Information (DPI)
2.3. Indirect Reward Full Information (IFI)
The investment game with Indirect reward and Full Information (IFI) is dis-
played in figure 3. It is equivalent toDFI except for the way rewards are handled.
Namely, in IFI the reward yi chosen by player Yi is not transferred to player Xi,
but to player Xj (i = 1, 2, i 6= j). Player Xi is informed about yj , and the game
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ends. Thus, the payoffs are
Player Xi : 10− xi + yj
Player Yi : 10 + 3xi − yi
for i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
X1
Y1
1y
receives 3 times x1
 x 2  y 2
X2
Y2
receives 3 times x2
 x 1
Figure 3 : Indirect Reward Full Information (IFI)
So, in IFI a player Xi cannot be rewarded by the person who received his invest-
ment, but by another person who may or may not have received an investment
by player Xj (indirect reward).
In IFI treatment, all players, X1, X2, Y1 and Y2 are informed about both, x1 and
x2. These information flows are visualized by the dotted curves in Figure 3.
3. Economic Rationality versus Trust and Reciprocity
The game theoretic analysis of all three investment games is trivial: Pure income
maximization calls for y∗i = 0 independent of the level of investment and of the
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game type. Consequently, investment should be zero as well (x∗i = 0). The same
holds if one assumes maximization of a more general utility function, as long as
one relies on individualistic preferences and non—satiation in money.
But previous experiments on DPI—games showed positive rewards (see e.g. Berg
and al. (1995) and Dufwenberg, and al. (2000); in both studies 80% of the subjects
reward the trustors). In line with other authors we refer to it as ‘reciprocity’. More
specifically, reciprocity proposes a positive relationship between the reward person
X receives from person Y and the investment which X sent to Y beforehand. X’s
investment may be seen as a trustful move: X trusts in Y ’s reciprocity. We call
this the ‘Trust—Reciprocity’ mechanism.
In our study we investigate whether trust and reciprocity are effective even with
indirect reward. We expect that some participants will invest and be rewarded
even in IFI, but that on average investments and rewards will be lower than in
DFI. Indirect reward makes trust and reciprocity less powerful. While this might
be intuitively convincing, it is not backed by rationality. Even if one allows for
noisy play, thereby justifying positive investments and rewards, rationality does
not lead to a differential prediction between games.
DPI is a control treatment, which allows for comparison with other studies. Fur-
thermore comparing behavior between DPI and DFI allows to assess the impact
of ‘social comparison’. The only difference between the two games is whether
player Yi is informed about both investments or only about the investment he
received himself. So, in DFI he can compare xi and xj (social comparison) but in
DPI he can not. Therefore we will attribute any difference in behavior between
the two games to the impact of social comparison.
4. Experimental Procedures
The experiment took place as a classroom experiment with 94 student partici-
pants (undergraduates in economics and business administration attending the
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same course). Participants were seated in a large lecture hall with sufficient space
between them such that they could not observe each others’ decisions. Com-
munication between participants was forbidden. After being seated they received
written instructions (see Appendix A). Instructions were written in English rather
than German to facilitate replication in another country. Each subject partici-
pated only in a single game and received only the instructions for that game.
Clarifying questions were asked and answered privately. Then we asked the par-
ticipants to fill out a control questionnaire (Appendix B) in order to check for
understanding. Only after all questions had been correctly answered the experi-
ment continued. ThenX—decision forms were distributed (see Appendix C) toX—
participants. After investment decisions had been made the forms were collected,
and the investment decisions were entered into the Y -decision forms (Appendix
D) according to the rules of the respective game (full information versus partial
information). The Y -decision forms were then distributed to Y —participants and
collected after they had made the reward decisions. Players Xi were informed
about the reward they received (yi in DFI and DPI, yj in IFI).
Finally, participants had to answer a simple post-experimental questionnaire (see
Appendix E). The questionnaire mainly asks how one would have behaved in the
respective other role and how one rated one’s partners on a bipolar scale. These
data were collected as an additional source of information, but we will not use
them here.
Monetary earnings were 15 DM on average (about 8 US$ at the time of the
experiment).
5. Empirical Analysis
Individual decision observed in DFI, DPI and IFI are respectively reported in
Table 1, 2 and 3 (Appendix F). In this section, we present our main finding (result
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1) and some additional ones (results 2 to 4). A discussion and some intuitive
justification of the observed effects will be provided in the next section.
Result 1: Indirect reward decreases investment: xi(IFI) < xi(DFI).
Figures 4 shows the frequency distributions of investments for each treatment.
Figure 5 contains the respective cumulative frequency distributions (cdf ’s). Com-
paring the cdf ’s shows that the cdf for DFI first order stochastically dominates
that of IFI. Mean investments are 1.9 in IFI compared to 6.9 in DFI. A Mann-
Whithney U-test (MWU) clearly rejects the Null-Hypothesis in favor of result 1
(p = 0.002, one—tailed, exact test, N = 36).
Result 2: Social comparison increases investment: xi(DFI) > xi(DPI).
According to figure 5 the line representing the cdf of DPI lies almost everywhere
above that of DFI. In both treatments about 80% of players Xi choose posi-
tive investment. Mean investment in treatment DFI is 6.1 compared to 4.8 in
DPI (see table 4). However, since the variances are large, the difference is not
statistically significant according to a Mann-Whithney U-test (MWU: p = 0.266,
one—tailed, exact test, N = 29). Further non—parametric tests regarding other
distributional changes (e.g. the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample test as well as
the Moses test) report insignificance as well.
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Figure 4: Frequency distributions of xi−investments for DPI, DFI and IFI
treatment.
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From results 1 and 2 one can conclude that indirect reward affects investment
behavior more strongly than social comparison. I.e., starting from a situation
where both, social comparison and direct reward are present (treatment DFI),
removing social comparison (DPI) reduces investment, and introducing indirect
reward (IFI) reduces investment as well. But, the decrease due to indirect reward
is stronger than the decrease due to removing social comparison. This is supported
by the finding that investment is significantly smaller in DPI compared to IFI
(MWU: p = 0.013, one—tailed, exact test, N = 29).
Result 3: Many trustees do not reward at all; i.e., they choose yi = 0.
Table 4 reports that on average about 66% of all trustees chose zero reward
(yi = 0). The proportion varies between treatments. It is 45% in DPI, 61% in
DFI and as high as 83% in IFI. Compared to other experiments on investment
games these numbers are quite high. For instance, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe
find a zero reward proportion of 25% in their no history treatment1. Including
reward equals to 1 let this number increase to 50% which is comparable to the
reward behavior observed in ourDPI treatment (54%). Others report proportions
between 24% and 33% (Fahr and Irlenbusch (1998), Dufwenberg et al. (2000),
Willinger et al. (2000)). So, even in our control treatment DPI featuring the
game of Berg et al. rewards of zero occurred more often than in these other
studies. Also the proportion of zero investments (xi = 0) is high. It is 35% on
average and 18% in DPI compared to the 6% and 11% respectively reported in
Berg et al.’s no history and history2 treatments.
1This situation corresponds to the basic trust game replicated by our DPI−treatment.
2In the history treatment, Berg, and al. provide information about trust and reward behavior
observed in previous sessions (of the no history treatment) to their subjects.
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Figure 5: Cumulative frequency distributions of xi−investments for DPI, DFI
and IFI treatment.
We can only speculate about the reasons for these differences. One reason might
be that all our subjects were students of economics and business administration,
who might be more focussed one making money than average persons (cf. Frank,
Gilovich and Regan (1993)). Bolle (1998) found also a high proportion of no
trust (24%) for students of economics (note that in his study trustor had only
the possibility to trust fully, i.e. investment was either equal to player X total
endowment or nil). While the large proportions of zero investments and zero
rewards are somewhat surprising, these data do not question our main conclusions
regarding comparisons between treatments. The probability of being rewarded is
lower with indirect reward (IFI) than with direct reward (DFI and DPI). This
is in line with what we proposed above.3
Result 4: We find reciprocity when reward is direct. Reward is higher when social
comparison is favorable.
3Chi-Square tests upon these differences fail. To support this point statistically, we would
have to collect more data.
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Treatments DFI DPI IFI
N − pairs (Xi, Yi) 18 11 18
xi −medians 8 3 0
xi −means 6.1 4.8 1.9
xi − Std. dev. 17.11 16 10.06
yi −means 4.3 5.3 .8
yi − Std. dev 6.6 6.8 2.4
proportion of xi = 10 .33 .27 .06
proportion of xi = 0 .22 .18 .61
proportion of yi = 0 .61 .45 .83
proportion of (yi > xi > 0) .50 .67 .29
Return on investment4 .71 1.09 .43
Table 4: Main statistical results
Berg, et al., (1995), Dufwenberg et al., (2000), Willinger et al. (2000) found
evidence for reciprocal behavior in the sense that reward was positively correlated
with investment. Nevertheless, none of these studies show significant correlation
between donation and reward behavior. To see whether this is supported by our
data as well we ran a regression analysis in which the dependent variable yi was
coded into {0, 1} to estimate the probability of positive reward5 prob(yi > 0). We
estimated the following logit regression model:
prob(yi > 0) =
1
1 + e−zi
4For all teatments, the return of investment corresponds to
P
yi/
P
xi.There is no difference
between the direct (DPI and DFI) and indirect (IFI) treatments due to separate addition in
numerator and denominator.
5The dependent variable yi is 1 if yi > 0 and it is 0 otherwise.
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with
zi = α +β1xi,DFI + γ1(xi,DFI − xj,DFI)
+β2xi,IFI + γ2(xj,IFI − xi,IFI)
+β3xi,DPI
i = 1, 2. The variable xi,DPI represents a dummy variable for the investment of
player Xi in treatment DPI. It is defined as
xi,DPI =



xi(DPI) , if player Xi belongs to treatment group DPI
0 , otherwise.
All other variables are defined analogously. α,β1,β2,β3,γ1 and γ2 are parameters
to be estimated.
Table 5 reports estimation results. Overall the estimated model is insignificant.
This might be due to the large proportion of choices xi = 0. Nevertheless we
shortly discuss the qualitative effects. The model captures at once the influences
of different reward rules as well as social comparison for all three treatments. The
parameters β1,β2 and β3 are positive. So, the investment which player Yi receives
has a positive influence on the probability of reward in all three treatments. Note
that the influence is estimated separately for each treatment condition. It is
significant for (DFI) and (DPI); i.e., with direct reward.6 This is evidence for
reciprocity. It replicates findings of other studies on direct reward games. The
return on investment (
P
yi/
P
xi) is larger than 1 in DPI (see table 4). So, in
this treatment on average it paid to invest a positive amount. But it did not pay
in DFI and IFI. Thus, even though we find reciprocity, most reward decisions
were unfair in the sense that an investor received less than his invested amount.
6In separate regressions for each treatment only the effect of xi,DFI is significant.
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Variables B. S.E. Sig.
xi,DFI β1 .256 .129 .046
xi,IFI β2 .230 .120 .055
β3xi,DPI β3 .209 .209 .333
(xi,DFI − xj,DFI) γ1 −.004 .120 .973
(xj,IFI − xi,IFI) γ2 −.016 .215 .941
α −1.738 .584 .003
Log Likelihood 51.705
N 47
Table 5: Estimation results of our logit regression model.
The influence of social comparison is estimated separately for DFI and IFI. The
coefficient γ1 measures the influence of (xi,DFI − xj,DFI), which is the excess in-
vestment of player Xi compared to player Xj . The larger this difference the more
favorably player Xi compares to Xj . If social comparison is important for behav-
ior, this should increase player Yi’s inclination to reward Xi. Thus, γ1 should be
positive, which it actually is although not significantly. Similarly, γ2 measures the
influence of (xj,IFI −xi,IFI) which is the excess investment of player Xj compared
to Xi. Remember that in treatment IFI it is player Xj who receives the reward of
player Yi. Thus, one should naturally expect that γ2 is positive. But, it is negative
and thus counterintuitive. However, it is insignificant.
6. Discussion
The main issue of our study was to investigate whether trustful investment and
reciprocal reward occur even when reward is indirect rather than direct. More
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specifically, we investigate whether the reward mode makes a difference. The
answer to both questions is yes: even with indirect reward we observe positive
investments and positive reward. But, compared to the direct reward treatment,
investment and reward are substantially and (statistically) significantly reduced.
We think this result is an important qualification of the functioning of the ‘trust—
reciprocity’ mechanism. Trust and reciprocity do not work at the same level for
all reward modes. With direct reward the ‘trust—reciprocity’ mechanism can be
regarded an implicit contract. The trustor chooses an investment and sends it
to a person he trusts in. He may not only hope but expect to receive a reward,
similar to someone who expects to be paid according to a contract that was agreed
upon. If reciprocity is a social norm then the ‘trust—reciprocity’ mechanism has
the character of an implicit contract.
This seems different with indirect reward. Here, investment has the character
of gift giving or a donation. It can not be considered an implicit contract on
an exchange between two parties, simply because the recipient of the donation
is not the person who may reward. In principle, on might think of the four
parties (players X1, X2, Y1 and Y2) forming an implicit contract. However, this
would be a more complex contract than an two person one, and we consider it
less natural. In any case these are just some informal and suggestive arguments
regarding subjects’ possible perceptions of the different reward modes. They are
intended to give an intuitive justification for the effect we found, since this cannot
be justified according to economic rationality. Thus our results shed new light
on the Titmus−debate as discussed by Dufwenberg et al. (2000). Rationality
does not lead to differential predictions regarding the treatment influence. It
predicts zero investment and zero reward in all treatments. Even allowing for
noise play does not help. With noise one may rationalize positive investment and
reward levels; however, this does not account for a systematic differences across
treatments.
We also found that investment and rewards are to some degree influenced by social
comparison. Social comparison increases investment and it increases the reward
of that investor who compares favorably to another investor. Both findings are
preliminary, however. They need to be statistically validated by other studies.
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Appendix A
Instructions −DFI−
In the experiment you will interact anonymously in groups of four participants.
You will not be informed about their identity nor will they be informed about
yours.
Let us denote the four participants that interact in one group by X1, X2, Y1,
and Y2. Each participant gets DM 10 as an initial endowment. You will interact
according to the following rules
1. X1 chooses x1 with 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 10.; the amount 3 · x1 will be sent to Y1.
X2 chooses x2 with 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 10.; the amount 3 · x2 will be sent to Y2.
2. All four participants are informed about both, x1 and x2.
3. Y1 chooses y1 with 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 10 + 3x1; the amount y1 will be sent to X1.
Y2 chooses y2 with 0 ≤ y2 ≤ 10 + 3x2; the amount y2 will be sent to X2.
This ends the interaction.
Monetary earnings are calculated as follows
• 10− x1 + y1 for X1
• 10 + 3x1 − y1 for Y1
• 10− x2 + y2 for X2
• 10 + 3x2 − y2 for Y2
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Please, raise your hand if you have questions concerning these rules. We will try
to clarify them privately.
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Instructions −DPI−
In the experiment you will interact anonymously in groups of four participants.
You will not be informed about their identity nor will they be informed about
yours.
Let us denote the four participants that interact in one group by X1, X2, Y1,
and Y2. Each participant gets DM 10 as an initial endowment. You will interact
according to the following rules
1. X1 chooses x1 with 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 10.; the amount 3 · x1 will be sent to Y1.
X2 chooses x2 with 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 10.; the amount 3 · x2 will be sent to Y2.
2. Only participant Y1 is informed about x1, Only participant Y2 is informed about x2.
3. Y1 chooses y1 with 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 10 + 3x1; the amount y1 will be sent to X1.
Y2 chooses y2 with 0 ≤ y2 ≤ 10 + 3x2; the amount y2 will be sent to X2.
This ends the interaction.
Monetary earnings are calculated as follows
• 10− x1 + y1 for X1
• 10 + 3x1 − y1 for Y1
• 10− x2 + y2 for X2
• 10 + 3x2 − y2 for Y2
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Please, raise your hand if you have questions concerning these rules. We will try
to clarify them privately.
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Instructions −IFI−
In the experiment you will interact anonymously in groups of four participants.
You will not be informed about their identity nor will they be informed about
yours.
Let us denote the four participants that interact in one group by X1, X2, Y1,
and Y2. Each participant gets DM 10 as an initial endowment. You will interact
according to the following rules
1. X1 chooses x1 with 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 10 ; the amount 3 · x1 will be sent to Y1.
X2 chooses x2 with 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 10 ; the amount 3 · x2 will be sent to Y2.
2. All four participants are informed about both, x1 and x2.
3. Y1 chooses y1 with 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 10 + 3x1; the amount y1 will be sent to X2.
Y2 chooses y2 with.0 ≤ y2 ≤ 10 + 3x2; the amount y2 will be sent to X1.
This ends the interaction.
Monetary earnings are calculated as follows
• 10− x1 + y2 for X1
• 10 + 3x1 − y1 for Y1
• 10− x2 + y1 for X2
• 10 + 3x2 − y2 for Y2
Please, raise your hand if you have questions concerning these rules. We will try
to clarify them privately.
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Appendix B
Control Questions
Please, fill out this questionnaire completely.
To check whether you have understood the instructions we kindly ask you to derive
the payoff consequences of some arbitrarily specified decisions, namely x1 = 7,
x2 = 3, y1 = 5, y2 = 9.
How much does each of the four participants earn?
X1 earns
Y1 earns
X2 earns
Y2 earns
What is minimal/maximal amount of total earnings (by X1, Y1, X2, and Y2)?
All four participants together earn at least
All four participants together can earn at most
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Appendix C
• Player X-decision form in DPI treatment:
1. You are X1 and you get an initial endowment of 10 DM.
Please, choose x1 with 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 10; x1 = (Please, fill in !)
2. The amount 3 · x1 will be sent to Y1.
And, only participant Y1 is informed about x1.
3. Y1 sends you y1 = (Will be filled in by experimenter)
Your monetary earning is 10− x1 + y1 = (Please, calculate yourself)
• Player X-decision form in DFI treatment:
1. You are X1 and you get an initial endowment of 10 DM.
Please, choose x1 with 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 10; x1 = (Please, fill in !)
2. The amount 3 · x1 will be sent to Y1
You have chosen x1 =
X2 has chosen x2 =



(will be filled by the experimenter)
3. Y1 sends you y1 = (Will be filled in by experimenter)
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Your monetary earning is 10− x1 + y1 = (Please, calculate yourself)
• Player X-decision form in IFI treatment.
1. You are X1 and you get an initial endowment of 10 DM.
Please, choose x1 with 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 10; x1 = (Please, fill in !)
2. The amount 3 · x1 will be sent to Y1
You have chosen x1 =
X2 has´ chosen x2 =



(will be filled by the experimenter)
3. Y2 sends you y2 = (Will be filled in by experimenter)
Your monetary earning is 10− x1 + y2 = (Please, calculate yourself)
Appendix D
• Player Y-decision form in DPI treatment.
1. You are Y1 and you get an initial endowment of 10 DM.
2. X1 sends you x1 = (Will be filled in by experimenter)
Only you and participant Y1 are informed about x1.
You dispose of the amount 10 + 3x1 = (Please, calculate yourself)
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3. Please, choose y1 with 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 10 + 3x1 y1 = (Please, fill in !)
The amount y1 will be sent to X1.
Your monetary earning is 10 + 3x1 − y1 = (Please, calculate yourself)
• Player Y-decision form in DPI treatment.
You are Y1 and you get an initial endowment of 10 DM.
1. X1 sends you x1 = (Will be filled in by experimenter)
You dispose of the amount 10 + 3x1 = (Please, calculate yourself)
2.
X1 has chosen x1 =
X2 has chosen x2 =



(will be filled by the experimenter)
3. Please, choose y1 with 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 10 + 3x1 y1 = (Please, fill in !)
The amount y1 will be sent to X1
Your monetary earning is 10 + 3x1 − y1 = (Please, calculate yourself)
• Player Y-decision form in IFI treatment.
You are Y1 and you get an initial endowment of 10 DM.
1. X1 sends you x1 = (Will be filled in by experimenter)
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You dispose of the amount 10 + 3x1 = (Please, calculate yourself)
2.
X1 has chosen x1 =
X2 has chosen x2 =



(will be filled by the experimenter)
3. Please, choose y1 with 0 ≤ y1 ≤ 10 + 3x1 y1 = (Please, fill in !)
The amount y1 will be sent to X2
Your monetary earning is 10 + 3x1 − y1 = (Please, calculate yourself)
Appendix E
Postexperimental Questionnaire
Imagine that you are participant Y2 in the previous experiment and that you
observe values of x1 and x2 as shown in the left column of the following
table (table 1). Please insert into the right column which decision y2 you
would choose in each respective case.
Values My choice:
x1 = 0, x2 = 10 y2 =
x1 = 10, x2 = 0 y2 =
x1 = 0, x2 = 0 y2 =
x1 = 5, x2 = 5 y2 =
x1 = 10, x2 = 10 y2 =
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(2) Now, imagine that you are participant X1 and that you would observe values
of x2 as shown in the left column of table 2 (see below) before you have to
choose x1. Please insert into the right column which decision x1 you would
choose in each respective case.
Values My choice:
x2 = 0 x1 =
x2 = 1 x1 =
x2 = 5 x1 =
x2 = 9 x1 =
x2 = 10 x1 =
(3) Which x1 would you have chosen as X1 without information about x2?
I would have chosen x1 =
How would you have reacted as Y1 given you had observed this choice of
x1?
As Y1 I would have reacted to x1 by choosing y1 =
(4) Please, rank on the following scale how much you like or dislike the other
three participants in your group.
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do not like X1 at all like X1 very much
do not like X2 at all like X2 very much
do not like Y1 at all like Y1 very much
do not like Y2 at all like Y2 very much
Appendix F
Individual data per treatments
Table 1: Treatment with Direct reciprocity and Partial Information (DPI).
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Decisions
DPI X Y
3 0
0 0
8 16
10 0
0 0
2 1
3 9
10 20
5 8
10 0
2 4
Averages 4,8 5,3
Std. Dev. 3,8 6,8
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Table 2: Treatment with Direct reciprocity and Full Information (DFI):
DFI Decisions
Groups X1 Y1 X2 Y2
A 10 0 6 8
B 10 5 8 0
C 10 0 1 0
D 10 0 10 5
E 0 0 5 0
F 0 0 0 0
G 0 0 8 16
H 4 0 9 18
I 10 20 8 5
Averages 6 2.8 6.1 5.8
Std. Dev. 4.6 6.3 3.3 6.6
Table 3: Treatment with Indirect reciprocity and Full Information (IFI).
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DFI Decisions
Groups X1 Y1 X2 Y2
A 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 0 0
C 8 1 10 0
D 5 0 0 0
E 0 0 0 0
F 0 0 2 0
G 3 0 0 0
H 0 0 6 4
I 0 10 1 0
Averages 1,8 1,2 2,1 0,4
Std. Dev. 2,8 3,1 3,3 1,3
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